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are taken into account. The inter-temporal utility of the low-skilled nevertheless increases
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Despite rather mixed conclusions about their eﬀects, active labour market policies (ALMPs)
play a very important role in the European Employment Strategy (EES). Among other things,
the underlying diagnostic considers that the matching between job-seekers and vacancies is
ineﬃcient. To address that problem, European guidelines recommend to reform tax and
beneﬁt systems and to develop services such as advice and guidance, job search assistance and
personalized action plans (henceforth “counselling programmes”). The ﬁrst group of reforms
have been analyzed elsewhere (see in particular Holmlund, 1998, Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2003, Boone and Bovenberg, 2005, and Chon´ e and Laroque, 2005). This paper focusses
on counselling programmes. Several countries have already implemented such programmes
(e.g. the intensive contact programme in Denmark, the new deal in the U.K., the Programme
d’Action Personnalis´ e in France and the Plan d’Accompagnement des Chˆ omeurs in Belgium).
These labour market interventions are developed on a rather large scale. This raises the
question of their equilibrium eﬀects. This paper addresses two policy issues. How does the
equilibrium impact of counselling programmes vary with their size and their microeconomic
eﬀectiveness? How do these programmes interact with labour market institutions such as
unemployment insurance and wage formation?
The EES considers the employment rate as the major evaluation criterion. Since the
Nice European Council in 2000, there is however a growing concern for the quality of jobs.
The well-being of the job-seekers is also a matter of concern. Heckman (2001) urgently calls
for equilibrium evaluation approaches that care about distributional consequences and cover
a range of evaluation criteria. The present analysis distinguishes diﬀerent skill groups and
adopts labor market performance and the level of welfare as criteria.
This paper makes two methodological contributions to the literature. First, ALMPs have
complicate eﬀects on employment, wages and welfare that are not well understood yet (see
Calmfors, 1994, and Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om, 2002). This paper explains the
complex mechanisms in a simple and yet fairly general setting of a Continental European
labour market. Inﬁnitely-lived individuals are risk averse, job-search eﬀort and participation
to the labour market are endogenous and wages are bargained over by incumbent employees
on behalf of all workers. Moreover, workers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: Their skill
and their utility when inactive. Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om (2002) point to the need of
a better understanding of an omitted relationship, namely the one between policies and job-
search eﬀort. The present paper investigates this relationship. The complex picture proposed
by Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om (2002) should then become even more intricate. It is
not. The model developed here actually allows to simplify the presentation of the eﬀects at
work. Many of these can be characterized analytically.
Second, this paper does not only conﬁrm that general equilibrium programme evaluations
can lead to conclusions that are very diﬀerent from those based on a partial equilibrium
analysis. By distinguishing the various eﬀects at work, this paper shows that the general
equilibrium eﬀects themselves heavily depend on (i) the type and the range of behavioral
adjustments endogeneized by the researcher and (ii) labour market institutions (in particular
1those governing wage formation).
From a policy viewpoint, it is shown that increasing the rate of entry of the low-skilled
into counselling programmes has a positive direct eﬀect on their employment rate if certain
conditions (that are more stringent in the presence of a two-tired beneﬁt system) are fulﬁlled.
However, the indirect eﬀects are detrimental to employment through wage formation and
through the adjustment in job-search among nonparticipants. A simulation exercise indicates
that as more unemployed enter the programme, the sign of the change in employment shifts
from positive to negative when more and more induced eﬀects are taken into account. The
adjustment in job-search eﬀort among those who do not (yet) participate seems to be decisive.
Actually, wage bargaining is the key assumption. If the low-skilled wage is no more negotiated
but proportional to the high-skilled bargained wage, counselling programmes targeted on the
low-skilled have small net positive eﬀects on their employment rate. The simulation exercise
also illustrates the possible conﬂict between evaluation criteria. The (un)employment rates
and welfare criteria often lead to opposite conclusions.
From social experiments, Martin and Grubb (2001) conclude that counselling programmes
generally “show positive outcomes”. This is conﬁrmed by a recent non-experimental evalua-
tion using (un)employment duration data for France (see Cr´ epon, Gurgand and Dejemeppe,
2004). Blundell, Costas Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2004) use micro-data to evaluate the
eﬀects of the ﬁrst stage of the “New Deal” programme that mainly consists of job-search as-
sistance. They ﬁnd small positive employment eﬀects. By carefully designing several control
groups, they are able to estimate the importance of substitution eﬀects and induced eﬀects
on wages. They conclude that the latter are rather small. The present paper reaches similar
conclusions.
Counselling programmes can be used jointly with monitoring and sanctions. This com-
plementarity is not considered here (for an overview, see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2003).
Counselling programmes are very diﬀerent from (long-duration training) schemes that intend
to enhance skills (see Albrecht, van den Berg and Vroman, 2004, and Boone and van Ours,
2004) or to enlarge the set of occupations that are accessible (see Masters, 2000). In the
present paper, as the programme only aﬀects matching eﬀectiveness, the distribution of skills
is exogenously given.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
disentangles the equilibrium eﬀect of ALMPs. A numerical analysis is conducted in Section
4. Section 5 develops a sensitivity analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model deals with publicly-provided short-duration active programmes organized for the
unemployed. The policies considered here aim at improving the matching eﬀectiveness of the
beneﬁciaries through job-search assistance, job clubs, individual counselling, interviews and
the like.
22.1 Basic assumptions
Exogenous diﬀerences in skill and in utility levels while inactive are the two sources of het-
erogeneity in this economy. The model features a homogeneous good (the numeraire) and
labour. The good market is perfectly competitive. Returns to scale are constant. Each ﬁrm
uses one and only one type of skill n ∈{ 1,...,N}. The labour market is therefore by assump-
tion segmented in the skill dimension. For simplicity, a representative ﬁrm will be modeled
for each skill. Each ﬁrm is composed by ﬁlled and vacant occupations. In the simulation ex-
ercise of Section 4, an aggregate budget constraint of the State will introduce a link between
the labour markets.
A markovian model is developed in a continuous-time setting and in steady state for
a Continental European country (see Figure 1). In accordance with institutions in many
OECD countries, a two-tired beneﬁt system is assumed to prevail. An insured unemployed
whose ‘high’ beneﬁts has expired enters a state where (s)he indeﬁnitely can beneﬁt from a
(typically) lower unemployment or assistance beneﬁt. High beneﬁts expire at an exogenous
rate πn. For jobless individuals, three states are identiﬁed: Insured unemployment with high
beneﬁts (Un), insured unemployment with low beneﬁts (Xn) and participation in a counselling
programme (Tn). Employment (En) should be understood as salaried employment in private
ﬁrms. Inactivity, In, is the ﬁfth state. These upper-case symbols will designate both the
states and the number of individuals occupying them in steady state.
In a frictional economy, the ﬂow of hires, Mn, is a function of an indicator of the number of
job-seekers, Sn , and of the number of vacancies, Vn. The matching function Mn = m(Sn,V n)
is assumed to be increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree 1.
Firms post vacancies and this costs a ﬁxed amount Kn per unit of time. Jobless workers
search for a job or stay out of the labour force. Having Continental Europe in mind where
collective bargaining is widespread and following Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), it is assumed
that the current wage is bargained over by incumbent employees on behalf of all workers. The
fall-back level for theses ‘insiders’ is the intertemporal discounted utility of an unemployed
entering state Un, VU,n. If an agreement is reached, production occurs and the total surplus
is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. An exogenous fraction φn of the matches is
destroyed. The workers who occupied these jobs enter insured unemployment1 and these
jobs become vacant. As will soon be clear, workers have no incentive to quit.
Search intensity is endogenous. Let sU,n,s X,n and sT,n denote search intensities in the
various states. A unique exogenous matching eﬀectiveness parameter cn will be associated
to states Un and Xn.2 For participants to the programme, this parameter can be diﬀerent
and will be denoted cT,n. It is assumed that cT,n >c n > 0. The programme can intrinsi-
1This is a good approximation for countries such as Belgium that will be analyzed later. For other countries,
a distinction between eligible and ineligible workers can be important (see e.g. Lise, Seitz and Smith, 2004).
2A true-duration dependence eﬀect is not introduced for two reasons. First, the recent econometric litera-
ture downplays the importance of this eﬀect in Continental Europe (see Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2005, and the
papers they quote). Second, if true-duration dependence was included in our setting, changing the rate πn
would at the same time aﬀect the time-proﬁle of beneﬁts and the one of matching eﬀectiveness. This would
be very confusing.
3cally improve the eﬀectiveness of search eﬀort. The Public Employment Service (‘PES’) can
also give priority to participants to these programmes, in particular in the case of a closed
treatment of job oﬀers. Then, the measure of the supply-side in the matching function is
Sn ≡ cn (sU,n Un + sX,n Xn)+cT,n sT,n Tn.
Due to the constant returns to scale in the matching process, the model can be developed
in terms of tightness indicators measured in eﬃciency units, namely θn ≡ Vn
Sn. The rate
at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θn) ≡ Mn/Vn = m( 1
θn,1),q (θn) < 0. An ‘eﬃcient
job-seeker’ moves into employment according to a Poisson process with rate α(θn) ≡ Mn
Sn =
θn q(θn), with α (θn) > 0. An insured unemployed i endowed with skill n and searching for
instance with a search intensity si
U,n exits to employment at a rate to cn si
U,n α(θn).
The unemployed are assigned to treatment at an exogenous rate γn (conditioning the
access to a programme on the level of unemployment beneﬁt would arguably be considered
as discriminatory). Full compliance is assumed.3 The micro-econometric evaluation litera-
ture emphasizes that an average favourable eﬀect often conceals heterogeneous impacts. This
heterogeneity here implies that matching eﬀectiveness is not enhanced for a number of pro-
gramme participants. This is captured by an exogenous rate, λn, at which participants drop
out. Their marching eﬀectiveness is then the one of non-participants. It is quite natural to
assume that λn >φ n (∀n).
2.2 Preferences and search eﬀort
Individuals are risk averse and have no access to capital markets. Equilibrium search model
with risk averse workers are notoriously diﬃcult to handle. So, a simple separable instanta-
neous utility function is adopted, namely ln(c) − ψn
sξn
ξn , with c denoting consumption and s
eﬀort while ψn > 0 and ξn > 1 are parameters. Eﬀort in employment is ﬁxed and normalized
to zero.4
Let wn denote the net wage of an employed worker endowed with skill n. If wages were
bargained individually, this wage would be diﬀerent according to the state of origin, at least
at the level of entry into the ﬁrm. With the type of bargaining chosen here, there is a single
skill-speciﬁc wage. Let bι,n be the level of beneﬁt (ι = U,X,T). The following very plausible




Let r be the discount rate assumed to be common to all agents. Holding a job yields an
3It will turn out that entering a programme implies a gain for the unemployed. In principle, waiting for
a job oﬀer could be more advantageous. Nevertheless, the model rules this out. Programme participation is
nowadays more and more compulsory. As it is observed in several countries, participation to active programmes
is a suﬃcient condition to become eligible to high beneﬁts again. Relaxing this assumption substantially
complicates formulas without adding much insight.
4It could equally well be normalized to any other value without changing the results. An appendix in Van
der Linden (2003a) summarizes the major changes when an isoelastic function of consumption is used instead
of ln(C). A log disutility of search could also be chosen instead of the isoelastic speciﬁcation.
4intertemporal utility VE,n deﬁned by:
rVE,n = ln(wn)+φn(VU,n − VE,n) (1)
The level of job-search is optimized at any point in time. For an individual i endowed with
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{vX,n + cn si
X,n α(θn)(VE,n − V i
X,n)+γn(V i
T,n − V i
X,n)}. (4)
Only symmetric equilibria are considered, where all agents (of type n) have the same level
of search eﬀort. Henceforth, superscript i will be dropped. The ﬂows in Figure 1 require that
jobless people have an incentive to accept job oﬀers. The following proposition establishes
the ranking of intertemporal utilities (proofs of propositions are left to the appendix).
Proposition 1. ∀n,i fwn >b T,n ≥ bU,n >b X,n > 0, cT,n >c n and φn <λ n, then
VE,n >V T,n >V U,n >V X,n.
It will later be clear that the net wage veriﬁes the suﬃcient condition in Proposition 1.
The optimal levels of search eﬀort sU,n,s X,n and sT,n equalize the marginal cost and the
marginal return of search. So, they solve to the following (suﬃcient) ﬁrst-order conditions:
ψn (sU,n)ξn−1 = cn α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n), (5)
ψn (sX,n)ξn−1 = cn α(θn)(VE,n − VX,n), (6)
ψn (sT,n)ξn−1 = cT,nα(θn)(VE,n − VT,n). (7)
In each state, search eﬀort increases with the corresponding matching eﬀectiveness parameter,
tightness and the net utility gain. These ﬁrst-order conditions and Proposition 1 imply that
sX,n >s U,n. As far as sT,n and sU,n are concerned, by assumption, cT,n >c n but according
to Proposition 1, VE,n−VT,n <V E,n−VU,n. The sign of the diﬀerence sT,n−sU,n is therefore
analytically unclear. The same is true for sT,n − sX,n.
2.3 Job creation
For simplicity, taxation is linear. The tax rate is denoted τn. The ﬁrm’s discounted expected
return from an occupied (respectively, vacant) job is denoted ΠE,n (resp., ΠV,n) if this ﬁrms
operates in the skill segment n. Since, conditional on their skill, workers are equally produc-
tive, let yn be the constant marginal product of a ﬁlled vacancy. Consider that Kn, the cost
5of posting a vacancy and of selecting applicants, is proportional to yn : Kn ≡ kn yn. For each
skill n, the discounted expected returns satisfy the following conditions:
rΠE,n = yn − (1 + τn)wn + φn (ΠV,n − ΠE,n), (8)
rΠV,n = −kn yn + q(θn)(Π E,n − ΠV,n). (9)
Under free entry of vacancies, ΠV,n = 0 in equilibrium. This condition combined with
(8), (9) yields the skill-speciﬁc ‘vacancy-supply curve’. The latter is a decreasing relationship
between the net wage and the corresponding indicator of tightness:
wn = VS(θn | kn,y n,r,φ n,τ n) ≡
yn
 











2.4 The wage bargain
Wage rigidities will be introduced in Section 5. Until then, it is assumed that wages are
collectively bargained over in each segment (ﬁrm) n by ‘insiders’ whose inter-temporal utility
is VU,n in case of layoﬀ. Nash bargaining is assumed. This assumption per se is not essential,





βn (ΠE,n − ΠV,n)
1−βn , (11)
with 0 <β n < 1. The assumption of a single representative ﬁrm has been made for the sake of
simplicity. It does not imply that the wage bargain is centralized in such a way that insiders
and the representative ﬁrm take care of the equilibrium eﬀect of wages. So, tightness, the
level of allowances and of the tax parameters are taken as ﬁxed when wages are negotiated.









2.5 Wages and tightness in a symmetric equilibrium










If βn was equal to zero, the instantaneous utility in employment would be equal to the
minimum compensation that an unemployed requires to stop searching. As βn increases, a
growing share of the gain yn−wn(1+τn) (scaled by wn(1+τn)) accrues to the worker. The next
step consists in replacing rVU,n in (13) by a function of θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n and the parameters
of the model. First, the appendix shows that rVU,n can be written as a weighted average of
the instantaneous levels of utility in the three states of joblessness augmented with a term
6capturing in some way the return of search, namely vι,n + cι,n sι,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n),ι∈
{U,X,T}, in which cU,n = cX,n = cn. Next, combining (8), (10), (12) and the free-entry
conditions allows to rewrite VE,n − VU,n as:











Henceforth, V(θn) will designate V(θn | βn,k n,r,φ n,y n). So, if Sn =( sT,n,s U,n,s X,n) des-
ignates the levels of search eﬀort, Bn =( bT,n,b U,n,b X,n) the levels of beneﬁts and Zn =
(cn,c T,n,φ n,γ n,λ n,π n,k n,y n,r,β n) all the exogenous parameters except τn, the (net) ‘wage-
setting curve’ can be written in a compact way as (see the appendix for a precise deﬁnition):
ln(wn)=WS(θn,Sn | Zn,Bn) (15)
For each skill n, the wage-setting curve is upward-sloping in a (θn,w n) space. It can be shown
that the position of this curve is not aﬀected by marginal changes in search eﬀort levels (see
also Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001, and Lehmann and Van der Linden, 2004).
The downward-sloping vacancy-supply curve (10) and the upward-sloping wage-setting
equation (15) deﬁne the equilibrium value of wn and θn. The ln of (10) and (15) yield an
implicit equation for θn, namely F(θn,Sn | Zn,τ n,Bn) = 0 with :
F(·) ≡ ln(VS(θn | kn,y n,r,φ n,τ n)) − WS(θn,Sn | Zn,Bn) (16)
Marginal changes in search eﬀort do not aﬀect function F. Under constant replacement
ratios, the wage-setting curve is vertical. Put diﬀerently, this curve ﬁxes the equilibrium
value of tightness and the level of wages is then read from the vacancy-supply curve.
2.6 Search eﬀort as a function of tightness in equilibrium
Search eﬀort levels verify conditions (5), (6) and (7). The diﬀerences in utility levels that
appear in these expressions can now be replaced by their values in a symmetric equilibrium.
The procedure consists in expressing the diﬀerences in utility levels as a function of VE,n−VU,n.
Next, the properties of the wage bargain and the free entry condition are used via (14). The
equalities relating the levels of search eﬀort to equilibrium tightness can then be expressed
in a compact way as (see the appendix for a precise deﬁnition):
ΣU(θn,s U,n | Zn,Bn)=0 , ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,Bn)=0
and ΣT(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,Bn)=0
(17)
As long as beneﬁts Bn are ﬁxed in levels, equilibrium search eﬀorts do not explicitly depends
on wages. In addition, it can be checked that there are no cross-eﬀects: ∂Σι
∂sι  =0∀ι,ι  ∈
{{T,n},{X,n},{U,n}},ι = ι . Moreover, search eﬀort increases with tightness.
72.7 Extendingthe model
Conditional on (Zn,τ n,Bn), it is easily seen that the equilibrium, if any, is unique. Up to now,
the budget constraint of the State has been ignored. For each skill, let Ln denote the size of
the labour force and Pn the exogenous size of the working age population (P≡
 
n Pn). Let
lower case letters en,u n,x n,t n and vn be the rates obtained by dividing the absolute numbers
by Ln (e.g. en ≡ En
















where Q is an exogenous level of net expenses, pn ≡ Ln/Pn is the participation rate and C is
the average cost of the programme. Constraint (18) establishes the unique link between the
labour markets. To meet this constraint, one could either adjust the level of allowances (Bn)
or the one of taxes. Adjusting taxes is the most standard approach. Then, the uniqueness of
equilibrium is preserved if the replacement ratios are constant.
Participation is modeled in a very simple way (see Pissarides, 2000). Inactive people have
an arbitrage condition: Staying inactive or entering state Xn.5 Let [V1,n,V 2,n] be the ﬁnite
support of the distribution of intertemporal utility levels in inactivity, VI,n. With a uniform





3 Decomposingthe eﬀects of counsellingprog rammes
The model is now used to analyze the eﬀects of the ‘policy parameters’, namely the rate of
entry into counselling, γn, the rate of drop out, λn, and the matching eﬀectiveness of the
participants cT,n. These eﬀects are measured in steady state, tax rates τn being considered
as free parameters. The proofs are again left to the appendix.
3.1 Direct eﬀects on employment
Direct eﬀects are deﬁned as the impacts of cT,n,γ n and λn conditional on tightness measured
in eﬃciency units θn and on search Sn. If direct eﬀects were deﬁned conditional on the
number of vacancies and search, an increase in matching eﬀectiveness cT,n would improve the
hiring rate of participants but it would also reduce tightness in eﬃciency units. This would
create an externality that would in particular be unfavourable to nonparticipants (crowding-
out or substitution eﬀect). So, the impact on employment would a priori be ambiguous. Here,
5Alternatively, they could enter uninsured unemployment (i.e. start an unemployment spell without any
beneﬁt). However, in many OECD countries, people who are ready to take a job and have no income are eligible
to a minimum income guarantee. The latter is typically closely related to the lowest level of unemployment
beneﬁts, bX,n. So, the simplifying assumption made here is not a substantial limitation.
8conditional on tightness in eﬃciency units and on search eﬀort, raising cT,n can intuitively
only be good for employment. The reasoning is similar for an increase in any search eﬀort
level conditional on the others and on θn. Moreover, if the hiring rate of participants is higher
than the one of nonparticipants, one should expect that an increase in participation (higher
γn or lower λn) be also good for employment. This is true for λn. The same holds for γn
if beneﬁts are completely ﬂat: πn = 0 (see the appendix). However, this condition in no
more suﬃcient when beneﬁts decline over time. For, each additional unemployed who ﬂows
from state Un into the programme would instead have increased his (her) search eﬀort at
the moment of entry in state Xn. This is an argument in favour of targeting the programme
on those with low beneﬁts. It has however been argued above that this selectivity would
be considered as discriminatory. Notice that this discussion holds conditional on θn and Sn.
When these variables become endogenous, their equilibrium values will be diﬀerent whether
πn > 0o rπn =0 .
Proposition 2. For each skill n,





if cT,nsT,n is suﬃciently larger than cnsU,n and cnsX,n





if cT,nsT,n ≥ cnsU,n and cT,nsT,n ≥ cnsX,n
if cT,nsT,n <c nsU,n and cT,nsT,n <c nsX,n
Corollary 1. If πn =0 , cT,nsT,n >c nsU,n is a suﬃcient condition for ∂en
∂γn to be positive.
3.2 Eﬀects on vacancy supply and wage-setting
The vacancy-supply curve (10) relates the net wage to the rate at which vacancies are ﬁlled.
The latter only depends on tightness in eﬃciency units. So, a shift in cT,n,γ n or λn cannot
aﬀect the position of this curve. Since the programme has to be ﬁnanced, it is also useful
to notice that the vacancy-supply curve shifts downwards if the tax rate is augmented. In-
tuitively, a rise in taxation reduces the net instantaneous return of a ﬁlled vacancy. This
implies that for any level of tightness, the ﬁrm pays lower net wages under free (perfectly
elastic) entry of vacancies.
As the treatment is eﬃcient at the individual level (cT,n >c n), it improves the intertem-
poral position in unemployment and therefore has a wage-push eﬀect. This was a major point
made by Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993). Then, increasing participation (rising γn or lowering
λn) or the eﬀectiveness (cT,n) increases wage pressure. This should be understood at constant
tightness (in eﬃciency units) and tax levels. By the way, notice that the framework developed
above allows to sign the net impact of the variety of eﬀects on wage formation enumerated
in Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om (2002). That marginal changes in search eﬀort do not
9aﬀect the position of the wage-setting curve is clearly key to reach these clear-cut conclusions.
To sum up,
Proposition 3. The vacancy-supply curve is not aﬀected by cT,n,γ n and λn, while it
shifts downwards if τn increases. For any θn, the net wage increases (resp. decreases) with
γn and cT,n (resp., λn). For any θn, the net wage is independent of the tax rate τn.
3.3 Eﬀects on equilibrium tightness and wages
The policy parameters do not aﬀect the vacancy-supply curve (10). So, their impact on
equilibrium tightness θn is an immediate consequence of their impact on the wage-setting
curve. Any variation that has a wage-push eﬀect leads to a higher equilibrium net wage and
to lower tightness and conversely:
Proposition 4 For each skill n, the equilibrium net wage wn (respectively, the level of
tightness θn) increases (respectively, decreases) with γn and cT,n. The equilibrium net wage
wn (respectively, the level of tightness θn) decreases (respectively, increases) with λn. The
marginal tax rate τn has a negative eﬀect on the equilibrium net wage and on tightness. The
eﬀect of τn on tightness disappears under constant replacement ratios. Tax changes are then
entirely absorbed by net wages.
3.4 Eﬀects on search eﬀort
Looking at (5), (6) and (7), it is obvious that a more tight labour market stimulates search
eﬀort for given values of the intertemporal utility levels. In equilibrium, taking the wage
bargain and the free-entry condition into account, the relationships (17) between search
eﬀort and equilibrium tightness are still increasing. How do these relationships vary with
the policy parameters? Conditional on tightness, the equilibrium diﬀerence VE,n − VU,n is
given by the wage bargain and free entry: VE,n − VU,n = V(θn), where the function V(θn)
does not depend on the policy parameters (see (14)). Remembering the optimality condition
(5), the relationship between sU,n and θn is therefore not aﬀected by the policy parameters.
From (6), sX,n increases with VE,n − VX,n = V(θn)+( VU,n − VX,n). As VT,n >V U,n >V X,n,
those in state Xn gain more from the programme than those in state Un. So, the diﬀerence
VU,n − VX,n, computed from (2) and (4), shrinks with γn and so does sX,n (conditional on
θn). Finally, from (7), sT,n increases with VE,n − VT,n = V(θn) − (VT,n − VU,n). The lower
VT,n − VU,n, the higher sT,n. Quite intuitively, a higher rate of drop out, λn, reduces this
diﬀerence. The higher γn, the higher VU,n and, as we have just seen, the lower VU,n − VX,n.
Therefore, VT,n − VU,n, computed from (2) and (3), declines with γn. In sum, the relation
between sT,n and θn shifts upwards when γn (resp., λn) increases. The eﬀect of cT,n is more
complex. It can however be shown that the direct positive eﬀect (obvious from (7)) dominates
10indirect eﬀects.6 Table 1 summarizes these properties (look at the columns with the symbols
‘| θn’).
Table 1 also presents the comparative static properties when the adjustment in θn is taken
into account according to Proposition 4 (see the columns sU,n*, sX,n* and sT,n*). Table 1
indicates that because of its wage-push eﬀect (Proposition 4), γn also reduces the equilibrium
level of job-search eﬀort in states Un and Xn. The role of the other parameters on these
levels of eﬀort is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4. The net impacts of γn and
cT,n on sT,n is ambiguous because these parameters have negative eﬀects on tightness. The
tax parameters τn aﬀect equilibrium search eﬀorts via their impacts on tightness if beneﬁt
levels, Bn, are given. Under constant replacement ratios, equilibrium search eﬀort is no more
inﬂuenced by τn.
parameter sU,n | θn˚+ sU,n* sX,n | θn‡+ sX,n* sT,n | θn†+ sT,n*
γn 0 - - - + ?
λn 0 + 0 + + +
cT,n 0 - 0 - + ?
τn 0 - 0 - 0 -
Table 1. The sign of the adjustment in equilibrium job-search eﬀort induced by marginal
changes in the listed parameters.
˚ i.e. sU,n solving ΣU(θn,s U,n | Zn,Bn)=0 .
‡ i.e. sX,n solving ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,Bn)=0 .
† i.e. sT,n solving ΣT(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,Bn)=0 .
+ These partial eﬀects should be interpreted carefully. Exploiting (14) implies that wages are endoge-
nous but also that the behavior of ﬁrms is optimized. However, in (17), tightness θn is taken as a
free variable. An interpretation would be that the number of vacancies is optimally chosen by the
employers but Sn is adjusted to keep θn unchanged. Pissarides (2000) adopts the same approach.
* means that the adjustment in θn in equilibrium is taken into account.
3.5 Eﬀects on participation to the labour market
From (19), policy parameters that improve the intertemporal utility of job searchers VX,n will
raise participation to the labour market. The impact of the policy parameters on VX,n is hard
to sign analytically (see the appendix). The participation rate mainly inﬂuences the budget
constraint of the State (18) and hence the tax rates τn. The induced eﬀects of taxation have
already been discussed above.
6Following Boone and van Ours (2004), the eﬀect of counselling programmes could be modelled as a decline
in the level of search cost. One way of formalizing this would be trough a parameter, say χn ∈ [0,1[, in the
instantaneous utility functions: ln(bι,n) − (1 − χn)ψn (sι,n)
ξn/ξn. Raising χn would at the same time reduce
the marginal cost of search and its level. This would lead to an ambiguous adjustment in search eﬀort. For,
the lower the level of search costs, the higher the utility in the corresponding state and hence the lower search
eﬀort. This is the so-called ‘locking-in eﬀect’.
114 A numerical analysis
Because analytical results about the net eﬀects of counselling programmes on employment
and on welfare are ambiguous, Iconduct computational experiments that illuminate the
model’s implications in steady state.
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated for Belgium with the month as unit of time. Various surveys7,
published statistics8, other statistics collected for the purpose of this evaluation, and results
found in the literature have been used to calibrate the model. It should be stressed at the
outset that Ido not have access to individual data about (non-)participants nor to a pilot-
study.
Due to statistical availability, only two levels of skill are distinguished. Holding at most
a lower-secondary degree captures the notion of ‘low skill’ relatively well. The period 1997-
1998 has been used as a reference because the stocks were fairly stable at that time and some
crucial variables are not available for more recent years. At that time in Belgium, it turns
out that many beneﬁciaries of active programmes participated (often simultaneously) to a
combination of three interventions:9 Individual advice and guidance10, job-search assistance
(such as job clubs, tips on ﬁnding jobs and writing a successful resume) and short-duration
vocational training11. Due to constraints on data, those policies are taken as an aggregate and
henceforth called ‘counselling programmes’ or ‘the programme’ for short. Data in Eurostat
(2002a, 2002b) allow to estimate that the average cost C of these programmes amounted to
130 EURO per worker and per month (net of transfers to beneﬁciaries of these programmes).
The stock of participants to the programme was about 30,000 individuals (i.e. 0.7% of the
labour force).
A detailed description of the calibration and some information on the Belgian labour
market and institutions are left to the appendix. Table 2 presents the calibrated values and
the rates of people in the various states. From this table, an increase in γn has a direct positive
eﬀect on employment (Proposition 2). Skilled workers search more intensively. As expected,
they have higher matching eﬀectiveness parameters. The hiring rate of skilled participants
to the programme is 51% (respectively, 22%) higher than the one of the unemployed in state
Uh (respectively, Xh). In the case of the low-skilled, the corresponding rates are respectively
78% and 45%.12
7Simoens, Denys and Denolf (1998), Denolf, Denys and Simoens (1999) and Delmotte, Van Hootegem and
Dejonckheere (2001).
8Published by national and regional PES in Belgium and by Eurostat (2002a) and Eurostat (2002b).
9See Vos, Struyven and Bollens (2000).
10“Plan d’accompagnement des chˆ omeurs” i.e. a small number of meetings with a member of the PES
during a period of four months.
11According to annual reports of the regional PES, there exist very short programmes mixing counselling
and short-lived training that lasted about 100 hours on average.
12No microeconometric evaluation of the programme is available for Belgium. These relative diﬀerences are
12The calibrated values imply that the wage elasticity of salaried employment amounts to
low but reasonable values, namely -0.35 for low-skilled workers and -0.11 for skilled ones.
Finally, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the level of unemployment
beneﬁts (tightness remaining ﬁxed) is equal to 0.28 for the high-skilled and 0.16 for the low-
skilled. The latter elasticities are relatively low (according to Meyer (2002), an elasticity of
0.5 is a standard order of magnitude).
4.2 Simulation results
In the following simulations, the low-skilled rate of entry into the programme, γl, is increased
from 0 to 2% per month (0.6% being the calibrated value). The focus on this parameter
is motivated by current trends in Europe, namely the propensity of decision makers to use
counselling (and other) programmes on a large scale. In the following exercise, the treatment
is randomized and there is full compliance. Those assigned to the programme enter without
delay. So, this setting can be interpreted as an ideal social experiment.
Among the various evaluation criteria, exp[rV] denotes the certainty equivalent (in EURO/
month) of the skill- and state-speciﬁc levels of intertemporal utility. In addition, a utilitarian
criterion is considered: It weights the exp[rV] terms by the corresponding rates of people in
the various states.13 An other evaluation criterion will be the diﬀerence between the hiring
rate of participants, cT,lsT,lα(θl) and a counterfactual (the hiring rate of participants if they
did not take part to the programme). This counterfactual is here measured by the hiring
rate of the unemployed in state Ul, cl sU,l α(θl) (state Xl is obviously an alternative). Those
people have a positive probability of entering the programme at some future date however.
Therefore, their search behavior varies as γl increases. The other evaluation criteria displayed
in Figure 2 are labor market indicators with an emphasis on the low-skilled (among which
the unemployment rate ul + xl + tl).
Four approaches are distinguished that integrate step by step new channels through which
the programme can aﬀect the economy and the population. Consider ﬁrst the microeconomic
perspective (thin solid black lines in Figure 2) where the net wage, wl, tightness, θl, search
eﬀort of nonparticipants, sU,l and sX,l, the participation rate, pl and the tax levels τn are taken
as given and ﬁxed at their calibrated values. In this ﬁrst case (and the following ones), the
level of search eﬀort, sT,l, is aﬀected by changes in γl because the low-skilled inter-temporal
levels of utility and hence the pay-oﬀ of search eﬀort vary with γl. From the ﬁrst-order
condition (7), the marginal cost of search is increasing with sT,l. Tightness being ﬁxed, the
nevertheless in line with the post-programme eﬀects of vocational training found by Cockx (2003). In the
preferred speciﬁcation, he found that the exit rate out of unemployment increases by 62% after participation.
Informal evidence states that this might be induced by the counselling received by trainees rather by the
training content itself.
13The model is built under standard assumptions (see Pissarides, 2000). Consequently, intertemporal utility
levels are jump variables and a comparison of their steady-state values make sense even when r>0. When tax
rates solve (18) and in the case of the utilitarian criterion, stocks of people in the various states matter. The
latter do not adjust instantaneously because of labour market frictions. For a fully rigorous welfare analysis,
the dynamic paths of adjustment of these indicators towards the steady state should be taken into account.
13marginal gain of search is proportional to the diﬀerence VE,l − VT,l. For a given value of
sT,l, this diﬀerence is increasing with VT,l − VU,l (see (23) in the appendix).14 Since the
programme enhances matching eﬀectiveness, raising γl pushes VU,l upwards. This is also true
for VT,l but the eﬀect is delayed. So, the diﬀerence VT,l − VU,l shrinks with γl. And so does
VE,l − VT,l. The decline in the net gain of search induces participants to search less (and
this further reinforces the decline in VE,l − VT,l). Obviously then, the diﬀerence in hiring
rates, (cT,lsT,l − cl sU,l)α(θl), decreases with γl. The parameters in Table 2 are such that
an increase in γl has a direct positive impact on the (salaried) employment-workforce ratio
el (Proposition 2). The decline in sT,l is not suﬃciently strong to outweigh this eﬀect. The
steady-state unemployment rate ul +xl +tl is therefore somewhat reduced (the decline in xl
outweighs the increase in the relatively small rates ul and tl). Therefore, the net eﬀect on
cl(sU,l ul + sX,l xl)+cT,lsT,ltl is a priori ambiguous. Since it turns out to be negative and
tightness is ﬁxed, more vacancies are created (see the evolution of the vacancy-workforce ratio
vl). Turning to intertemporal levels of utility, two eﬀects are at work. First, as γl rises, those
in states Ul and Xl have more chances to beneﬁt from a welfare gain. Second, all welfare
gains and losses appearing in (1) to (4) shrink with γl. The rising proﬁles of VU,l and VX,l
result from these opposite eﬀects. On the contrary, VE,l and, since search sT,l is optimally
chosen, VT,l unambiguously increase.
Second, the endogeneity of wages and of labour demand is now introduced keeping search
eﬀort of nonparticipants, the participation rate and taxation at their calibrated values.15
Henceforth, replacement ratios are constant. An eﬀective programme raises the intertemporal
utility in unemployment. This has a direct wage-push eﬀect (Proposition 3) and induced
negative eﬀects on tightness (Proposition 4) and ﬁnally on the level of search eﬀort of the
participants (that now solves ΣT = 0 in (17)). The dotted red lines in Figure 2 indicate that
multiplying the rate of entry γl by about 3 (≈ 0.02/0.006) raises net wages by 0.8%. As in
Blundell, Costas Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2004), this eﬀect is rather small. Tightness θl
decreases by 3%. This and declining search eﬀort among participants compensate the direct
positive eﬀect of γl. So, low-skilled employment and unemployment remain approximately
constant. Compared to the microeconomic perspective, the decline in search eﬀort among
participants is reinforced by the cut in tightness. Somewhat lower hiring rates and higher
wages lead to some increase in intertemporal utility levels compared to the microeconomic
evaluation.
Third, in addition to wages and tightness, ‘supply decisions’ (search eﬀort of nonpartic-
ipants and participation to the labour market) are endogeneized. In Figure 2, dashed blue
lines display the eﬀects (in some panels, they are indistinguishable from the thick grey curves
that relate to the fourth evaluation setting). As expected from the theory, wages and tight-
ness are nearly not aﬀected.16 As explained in sub-section 3.4, sU,l and sX,l shrink with γl
14Wage negotiation being ignored here, the analysis necessarily diﬀers from the one in sub-section 3.4.
15The minimum wage introduces a wage-ﬂoor in the simulations. This constraint is not binding below.
16As the diﬀerence between the value of γl and 0.006 increases, the diﬀerence in search eﬀort becomes far
from marginal. This explains the (small) diﬀerence between dotted and dashed curves.
14because tightness declines.17 The magnitude of the eﬀect should be noticed. The elasticity
of search eﬀort with respect to the beneﬁt it generates is equal to 1/(ξl − 1). So, it could be
argued that our calibrated value for ξl is too close to 1. If this was true, the calibration should
lead to a high elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the level of unemploy-
ment beneﬁt. This is however not the case (see Sub-section 4.1). Compared to the second
setting (dotted lines), the decline of sU,l explains why the diﬀerence (cT,lsT,l − cl sU,l)α(θl)
is ﬂatter with respect to the rate of entry into the programme γl. Comparing again dashed
and dotted curves, the decline in search eﬀort among nonparticipants leads to ac ut in vl and
el. Therefore, the unemployment rate is now increasing with γl. From a welfarist point of
view, the decrease in search eﬀort, the rise in net wages and the more probable entry in the
programme do more than compensate the depressed employment perspectives. The rise in
VX,l has a positive yet small eﬀect on the participation rate pl.
Finally, this conﬂict between criteria could disappear when the budget of the State be-
comes binding (the thick grey lines in Figure 2). Since the programme turns out to create
a loss in employment and an increase in participation of the low-skilled, a rise in taxes is
unavoidable. For concreteness, Ihere assume somewhat arbitrarily that both tax rates τl
and τh are adjusted proportionately. Since unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to wages, real
wages are ﬂexible and they absorb changes in (linear) taxation. The low-skilled net wage is
now somewhat declining with γl. Changes in linear taxes do not aﬀect tightness, employment
nor search eﬀorts. In spite of lower net wages, whatever the state, the intertemporal welfare
of the low-skilled is still increasing in γl. On the contrary, higher taxes obviously lower the
welfare of the high-skilled. Because of these opposite eﬀects, the evolution of the utilitarian
criterion is hard to predict. It turns out to be declining with γl.
To sum up, on the basis of microeconomic evidence, programmes that enhance matching
eﬀectiveness should be recommended in Belgium according to a wide range of criteria. This
conclusion would still be supported by all the criteria when wages and vacancies are endo-
geneized (although the gain in employment becomes negligible). The unanimity between the
various criteria falls apart as soon as the nonparticipants’ search eﬀort becomes endogenous:
(Un)employment deteriorates with γl while the low-skilled intertemporal indicators of welfare
are improving. This conﬂict still holds when the ﬁnancing of the programme is taken into
account. Then, since the burden of ﬁnancing policies lies on both skill groups, there is in
addition a trade-oﬀ between the welfare of the low-skilled and the one of the high-skilled.
At least for some criteria, this simulation exercise highlights the possible conﬂicts between
recommendations made on the basis of micro evaluation and those emerging from a gen-
eral equilibrium perspective. Lise, Seitz and Smith (2004) conclude in the same way for the
Self-Suﬃciency Project in Canada.
17In a similar way, Lise, Seitz and Smith (2004) conclude that welfare recipients delay exit in order to qualify
for an income supplement.
155 Sensitivity analysis
These programmes look relatively cheap. At the same time, the available information on
their costs is relatively poor. For suﬃciently high values of the average cost C, unreported
simulation results show that the relationship between rVE,l and γl reaches a maximum and
then starts declining. To see this eﬀect, the average cost C has to be multiplied by at least
6. For such a value, the decline of exp[rVE,l] starts at γl ≈ 30%. As C further increases, the
maximum is reached for lower values of γl and the relationship between exp[rVT,l] and γl also
becomes inverse U-shaped. This discussion rests on the strong assumption that the average
cost C stays constant whatever the rate γl. As this parameter becomes suﬃciently higher
than the calibrated values, the average cost C could be (strongly) increasing. In Belgium at
least, there is a lack of data that would allow to specify a realistic cost function.
Programmes that improve matching eﬀectiveness and declining unemployment beneﬁts
could be two alternative ways of enhancing exit rates towards employment. The former
improve matching eﬀectiveness while the latter intends to boost search intensity (at least
at the beginning of an unemployment spell). The general-equilibrium eﬀects of declining
beneﬁts are analyzed elsewhere (see Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000, Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2001, and Van der Linden, 2003b). Proposition 2 suggests that the marginal direct impact
of the programme on employment should be more favourable when unemployment beneﬁts
are ﬂatter (i.e. lower πn). To illustrate that point for the low-skilled, keeping search and
tightness at their calibrated values, this marginal eﬀect amounts to 0.43 when πl =0 .083
and to 0.69 when πl =0 .0083. The design of unemployment insurance however aﬀects
equilibrium tightness θn and search eﬀort Sn and their adjustment to changes in γl. For some
criteria, Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that the relative eﬀects of increasing the size of counselling
programmes often worsen as unemployment beneﬁts become more generous. Comparing the
second to the third and fourth columns, this is true in the case of low-skilled employment
when the low-skilled replacement ratios rise and when the highest level of beneﬁts is on
average paid for a longer duration. The same conclusion holds for the welfare criteria when
the ﬁnancing of policies is taken into account.18 This suggests that active programmes that
enhance matching eﬀectiveness are not a substitute for a declining time-proﬁle of beneﬁts.
The model and the evaluation are based on the assumption that all wages are bargained
over. OECD data covering the period 1985-95 suggest that wage diﬀerentials are fairly stable
in Belgium. It is therefore worthwhile to envisage the case where the relative net wages are
ﬁxed and only the high-skilled one is negotiated. According to unreported simulations results,
all the induced eﬀects of a rise in γl become then very small. The last columns of Tables
3 and 4 display net eﬀects on some evaluation criteria. Table 3 corresponds to a situation
where the level of the low-skilled wage remains constant. A rise in the entry rate into the
programmes raises employment and the utility level of the unemployed (the same is true
for participants and those in employment). Turning to Table 4, given the assumption made
about the cost C, it turns out that the tax rates diminish slightly with γl. Each type of worker
18As low-skilled workers are hired at a very low rate, the criterion VU,l, yet not the utilitarian criterion, is
higher when unemployment beneﬁts are raised.
16then beneﬁts from an increase in γl. To conclude, programmes that enhance the low-skilled
matching eﬀectiveness have small positive eﬀects when relative wages are rigid. Above, the
assumption that the low-skilled wage is negotiated appears therefore to be essential to reach
opposite conclusions between micro and general equilibrium evaluations.
A ﬁnal sensitivity analysis deals with the normative criterion. In the previous section,
the low-skilled intertemporal utility level and the (un)employment criterion lead to opposite
conclusions as soon as search eﬀort of nonparticipants becomes endogenous. In the policy
debate, job-search eﬀort rarely enters value judgements. So, imagine that the normative
criterion becomes the intertemporal value of the ln of income. Unreported simulation results
indicate that this criterion measured for the low-skilled shrinks with γl as soon as search
eﬀort of nonparticipants becomes endogenous. For those in state Ul, the relative variation of
this criterion is −0.7% when taxes are ﬁxed (to be compared to +3.0% in the 2nd column of
Table 3) and −2.0% when the budget of the State is binding (to be compared to +1.6% in
the 2nd column of Table 4).
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an equilibrium matching model that is well-suited to conduct eval-
uations of short-duration programmes that raise the matching eﬀectiveness of participants.
In this model, workers are risk averse and heterogeneous in skill, job-search eﬀort is endoge-
nous and wages are bargained over. As other ALMPs, these programmes have quite complex
eﬀects in general equilibrium (see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om, 2002). This paper has
endogeneized new variables (job-search eﬀort and participation to the labour market) and
yet many clear-cut eﬀects have been analytically shown. Under certain conditions that are
more stringent in the presence of a two-tired beneﬁt system, increasing the rate of entry in
these programmes has a positive direct eﬀect on the employment rate. However, the indi-
rect eﬀects are detrimental to employment through wage formation and the adjustment in
job-search among nonparticipants.
This paper has also developed a simulation exercise. The calibration has been based on
an extensive and well-informed use of statistics and studies for Belgium. The results strongly
emphasize the importance of the choice of the evaluation criterion: Performance indicators
of the labour market and welfare criteria quite often lead to opposite conclusions because
the latter take care of the disutility of job-search eﬀort. This concern is quite natural in a
welfarist perspective but much less present in policy debates. The numerical analysis also
illustrates that the eﬀectiveness of labour market policies can vary as more and more ‘margins’
(wages, labour demand, search, participation,...) are endogeneized. In particular, the impact
of these programmes on employment changes from positive to negative as additional margins
are taken into account. As Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om (2002) were anticipating, the
role of search eﬀort turns out to be key. However, this property hinges upon the presence
of wage bargaining. The various ‘margins’ and in particular search eﬀort play a minor role
when relative wages are ﬁxed and only the high-skilled wage is negotiated. A microeconomic
17evaluation of such programmes should then be suﬃcient to guide decision makers about the
sign of the net eﬀects and to produce good approximates of their magnitude.
The precise microeconomic impact of couselling programmes matters. In this paper,
counselling programmes are assumed to enhance the matching eﬀectiveness of job seekers.
Instead of aﬀecting the matching technology, they could reduce the level of search cost,
either in a ﬁxed way or via a decline in the marginal cost of search (Boone and van Ours,
2004). These choices matter for an equilibrium evaluation. For instance, increasing matching
eﬀectiveness gives participants an incentive to search harder while a ﬁxed reduction in search
costs raises the participants’ utility and hence lowers their search eﬀort. Unfortunately,
most microeconometric evaluations take programmes as a black-box and hence cannot help
decide among these alternatives. An additional eﬀect of counselling programmes could be
to improve the quality of the match and hence to reduce the probability of separation (see
Cr´ epon, Gurgand and Dejemeppe, 2004). Such an eﬀect would raise the intertemporal value
of holding a job and hence moderate wages and stimulate equilibrium search eﬀort.
Finally, the targeting of the programme is also worth to be mentioned. In this paper,
after a job loss, people enter unemployment. Entry in the counselling programme comes
later. A drawback of this timing is that before entry, there is a locking-in eﬀect if the
programme is eﬀective (for participants and in a microeconomic perspective). An alternative
design would make (some) people enter the programme immediately after the loss of their job
and not later on. This would avoid the locking-in eﬀect but would reinforce the wage-push
eﬀect of eﬀective programmes. Conversely, with a two-tier beneﬁt system, entry into the
programme could arguably be restricted to the unemployed in the second tier. Direct eﬀects
on employment would then be more often favourable and the wage-push eﬀect would be less
severe. However, this design would reinforce the locking-in eﬀect before participation. Which
targeting is preferable? There is no general answer to that question. Everything depends on
wage-setting institutions and on the elasticity of job-search eﬀort with respect to its pay-oﬀ.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let
∆1,n ≡ (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)[[r + cnsU,nα(θn)+φn][r + cT,nsT,nα(θT)+λn]
+ γn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn]] + πn[[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn][r + cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]
+ γn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn]],
∆2,n ≡ r + πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn,
∆3,n ≡ r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn,
∆4,n ≡ r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn.
18Let δET,n ≡ ln(wn) − vT,n and διι ,n ≡ vι,n − vι ,n,ι,ι   ∈{ U,X,T},ι  = ι . The following
diﬀerences can be derived from Equations (1) to (4):
VE,n − VU,n =[ ( r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn)[(r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(ln(wn) − vU,n)
+πn(ln(wn) − vX,n)] + γn (r + πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(ln(wn) − vT,n)]∆−1
1,n, (20)
VU,n − VX,n =[ δUX,n+ cn(sU,n − sX,n)α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)]∆−1
2,n, (21)
VT,n − VU,n =[ ( r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(δTU,n+( cT,nsT,n − cnsU,n)α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n))
+πn (δTX,n+( cT,nsT,n − cnsX,n)α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n))][∆2,n∆3,n]−1, (22)
VE,n − VT,n =[ δET,n +( λn − φn)(VT,n − VU,n)]∆−1
4,n. (23)
By (20), it is obvious that VE,n >V U,n. Van der Linden (2003a) shows that VU,n >V X,n
and VE,n >V T,n.
Rewriting rVU,n
Substituting expressions (21) and (22) in (2) allows to write rVU,n as a function of VE,n−VU,n,
namely:
rVU,n =Ω U,n [vU,n + cnsU,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n) ]+Ω T,n[vT,n + cT,nsT,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)]
+ΩX,n[vX,n + cnsX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)], where (24)
ΩU,n ≡ [r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn][r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)]/(∆2,n∆3,n),ΩT,n ≡ γn/∆3,n,ΩX,n ≡
πn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn]/(∆2,n∆3,n) and ΩU,n +Ω T,n +Ω X,n =1 .
The (net) wage-setting curve
Combining (13) with (10), (14) and (24) yields then an explicit (net) wage-setting curve:
ln(wn)=WS(θn,Sn | Zn,Bn) ≡ ΩU,n [vU,n + cnsU,nα(θn)V(θn)] (25)
+ΩT,n[vT,n + cT,nsT,nα(θn)V(θn) ]+Ω X,n[vX,n + cnsX,nα(θn)V(θn) ]+( r + φn)V(θn)
Equilibrium search as a function of tightness
Replace VE,n−VX,n by VE,n−VU,n−(VX,n−VU,n)and VE,n−VT,n by VE,n−VU,n−(VT,n−VU,n).
Replace then VU,n−VX,n by (21) and VT,n−VU,n by (22). Finally, substitute Expression (14)
19for VE,n − VU,n. For each n, the ﬁrst-order conditions (5), (6) and (7) become then:
ΣU(θn,s U,n | Zn,Bn) ≡ ψn s
ξn−1
U,n − cn α(θn)V(θn)=0 , (26)
ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,Bn) = 0 (27)
where ΣX ≡ ∆2,n ψn s
ξn−1
X,n − cn α(θn)[δUX,n +( ∆ 2,n + cn [sU,n − sX,n]α(θn)) V(θn)],
ΣT(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,Bn) = 0 (28)
where ΣT ≡ ∆2,n ∆3,n ψn s
ξn−1
T,n − cT,nα(θn)[(∆2,n ∆3,n − [r + cn sX,nα(θn)+γn]
[cT,nsT,n − cn sU,n]α(θn) − πn[cT,nsT,n − cn sX,n]α(θn))V(θn)
− (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn) δTU,n − πn δTX,n].
Proof of Proposition 2
Equalities between entries and exits in each state and the identity 1 ≡ en + un + xn + tn
determine en,u n,x n and tn.If
∆5,n ≡ [cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn]([cnsU,nα(θn)+φn][cnsX,nα(θn)+γn]
+ πn [cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]) + γn [cT,nsT,nα(θn)+φn][πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn],
(29)
the employment rate is given by:
en =[ [ cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn](cnsU,nα(θn)[cnsX,nα(θn)+γn]
+πncnsX,nα(θn)) + γncT,nsT,nα(θn)[πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn]]∆−1
5,n. (30)







[πn(cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn)cn(sU,n − sX,n)
+( πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)((cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(cT,nsT,n − cnsU,n)
+ πn(cT,nsT,n − cnsX,n))]α(θn).
Since sU,n <s X,n, this derivative is only positive if cT,nsT,n is suﬃciently larger than cnsU,n
and cnsX,n.If πn =0 ,cT,nsT,n >c nsU,n is a suﬃcient condition for ∂en








+ πn(cnsX,n − cT,nsT,n)]α(θn),
which is negative if if cT,nsT,n is larger than cnsX,n.
Proof of Proposition 3
Diﬀerentiating (25), it can be checked that ∂WS
∂γn =
r+cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn









cT,n∆3,n ≥ 0. From (25), the
lack of eﬀect of τn is obvious.
20The intertemporal utility in state Xn
VX,n can be computed by exploiting the equality VX,n = VU,n−(VU,n−VX,n) and (21). VU,n can
then be replaced by VE,n−(VE,n−VU,n) with VE,n deﬁned by (1). Finally, VE,n−VU,n = V(θn)
is substituted everywhere. This leads to the following expression:
VX,n =
ln(wn) − (r + φn)V(θn)
r
−




Belgium is a country plagued with long-term unemployment. More than 60% of the stock
is unemployed for more than a year. The median duration in the stock amounts to about 2
years. In Belgium, negative duration dependence is very strong but Cockx and Dejemeppe
(2005) have shown that it is largely spurious. The level of skill (understood as education)
is one of the key individual characteristics that aﬀect the hiring rate. Low-skilled workers
represent about 34% of the labour force and 64% of the stock of unemployed. The salaried
employment-active population ratio is very low for this group (el =0 .61).19
Administrative data indicate that less than 2.5% of claimants do not receive unemploy-
ment beneﬁts in Belgium. Neglecting this phenomenon, there is ﬁrst a period of one year
where unemployment beneﬁts stay constant. With the month as unit of time, πn is therefore
equal to 0.083. For about two-third of the insured unemployed, the level of beneﬁts decreases
afterwards. Except for one sub-group, unemployment beneﬁts can be paid indeﬁnitely. In
1998, less than 2% of the unemployed have lost their entitlement (after a very long spell of un-
employment). This phenomenon is therefore neglected, too. The time-proﬁle of skill-speciﬁc
unemployment beneﬁts is an average computed from administrative data. The replacement
ratios are displayed in Table 2.20
Net wages and average tax rates are computed from the Panel Survey on Belgian House-
holds and Immervoll (2002). As Nordic countries, Belgium is characterized by low wage
diﬀerentials21. The calibration and the simulation of Section 4.2 use the model of Section 2
where all wages are bargained over, the legal minimum wage acting as a lower-bound.
The discount rate is ﬁxed at 0.004 (5% on an annual basis). Annual reports of the
PES allow to ﬁx parameters φn, λn and γn (see Table 2). As many other papers, let us
assume the following Cobb-Douglas matching function (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001):
19The model deals with private salaried employment. The calibration and the simulation take other cate-
gories of employment and vacancies as exogenous. These categories include some labour market programmes
such as direct job creation for the unemployed in the public sector.
20The replacement ratios are lower than reported values by the OECD on the basis of a range of earnings
and family situations (see e.g. Table A.1 of OECD, 1999). However, these OECD statistics exclude some
groups whose replacement ratio is quite low in Belgium.
21For Belgium, OECD data measure gross weekly earnings of full-time workers. In 1995, the D75/D25 ratio
was about 1.6 and D5/D1 amounted to 1.4. Income taxation being progressive in Belgium, it is not surprising
that net wage diﬀerentials are even lower.
21m(Sn,V n) ≡ m0S0.5
n V 0.5
n . Parameter m0 is a scaling factor for the various cι’s and for kn.
Assuming that m0 =0 .5 yields reasonable values.
The expected duration of a vacancy (2.5 month) and the share of the low-skilled in the
total number of recruitments (0.38) is used to calibrate the θ’s. The ‘vacancy-supply curves’
(10) are then used to calibrate the k’s. The unobserved vacancy costs can be interpreted
as a black-box capturing search, screening and training costs incurred by ﬁrms to recruit
workers. More generally, they implicitly also include all other set-up costs incurred in order
to create the job. This explains why the calibrated values of the cost K = k · y per vacancy
are often large in the literature.22 Parameter kn also aﬀects the wage-setting curve and hence
the calibrated value of the bargaining power. The marginal products yn are chosen so as to
produce sensible values for the ratio of the skill-speciﬁc wage bill to output net of vacancy
costs.
The products cιsι,ι= {T,n},{X,n},{U,n},n∈{ l,h} can be computed from the ﬂow
equilibrium conditions. Conditional on these products, the calibration then ﬁxes the cι’s, the
sι’s, ξn, and the bargaining power of the workers βn. This part of the calibration is based on
equations (15) and (17). This system is solved conditional on the assumption ψl = ψh =7 .4.
Raising this parameter induces a proportional increase in cT,n and cn and a proportional
reduction in all search-eﬀort levels without aﬀecting the other parameters.
Since workers are risk averse, the Hosios conditions βn =0 .5 does not guarantee that a
laissez-faire economy is optimal (see Lehmann and Van der Linden, 2004). One could wonder
why βl is higher than βh in Table 2. The relatively strong bargaining power of the low-skilled
clearly rationalizes the high value of wl relative to yl. In Belgium, unionization is a widespread
phenomenon, especially among blue-collar workers where union density is around 95%. In
addition, almost all workers are covered by collective agreements due to state extensions
of collective agreements. Finally, following Immervoll, Kleven, Thurstup Kreiner and Saez
(2004), the elasticity of the participation rate pn with respect to wn is ﬁxed to 0.4 for the
low-skilled and 0.2 for the high-skilled. These assumptions and the participation rates allow
to calibrate the boundaries V1,n and V2,n introduced in (19).
To check the validity of this calibration, Iﬁrst look at two properties of the model that were
not used during the calibration and about which some data are available. Then, Icompute two
major elasticities and compare them to standard values found in the literature (see Section
4.1). In 1997, the average stock of vacancies registered by the PES amounted to 24,500. With
a market share of the PES in the range [0.4,0.5], the calibrated stock of vacancies (53,000) is
an acceptable order of magnitude. The expected duration of an unemployment spell amounts
to 11 months for the skilled and 31 months for the low-skilled. Weighted by the share of each
skill in the inﬂow into unemployment, the mean duration would then be equal to 19 months,
a result that is in line with the computations of Dejemeppe (2005).23
22See Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and the references cited in their footnote 20.
23From her analysis of unemployment dynamics in Belgium, the average unemployment duration in 1992
was equal to 2years in the South of Belgium and to 1.5 years in the North.
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V/(U + X + T) 0.09 0.14
w (EURO/month) 1229 1512
Table 2. Calibration: Stocks in steady state, parameters and levels of endogenous variables.
26el Figure 2 Bl/wl + 25% πl/10 wl/wh rigid
γl =0 .001 0.621 0.465 0.548 0.612
γl =0 .02 0.591 0.368 0.512 0.617
Relative change -4.8% -20.9% -6.6% +0.8%
exp[rVU,l] Figure 2 Bl/wl + 25% πl/10 wl/wh rigid
γl =0 .001 685.95 768.36 726.83 690.12
γl =0 .02 706.65 812.48 746.12 695.14
Relative change +3.0% +5.7% +2.7% +0.7%
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis when all variables but taxes are endogenous. Impact on the low-
skilled (salaried) employment-active population ratio, el, and on the low-skilled intertemporal utility
for entrants in unemployment, exp[rVU,l] (in certainty equivalent; euros/month). “Bl/wl+25%” means
that the low-skilled the replacement ratios are raised by 25%.“πl/10” means that the rate at which
the unemployed move from ‘high’ to ‘low’ beneﬁts is divided by 10 (0.08 → 0.008). The last column
is such that the ratio wl/wh remains at its calibrated value i.e. 0.81.
Utilitarian activ. pop. Figure 2 Bl/wl + 25% πl/10 wl/wh rigid
γl =0 .001 895.57 836.32 861.59 892.90
γl =0 .02 885.48 778.28 844.87 893.81
Relative change -1.1% -6.9% -1.9% +0.1%
exp[rVU,l] Figure 2 Bl/wl + 25% πl/10 wl/wh rigid
γl =0 .001 688.44 715.17 689.12 690.09
γl =0 .002 699.48 701.87 692.74 695.94
Relative change +1.6% -1.9% +0.5% +0.8%
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis when all variables including taxes are endogenous. Impact on
the utilitarian criterion within the active population and on the low-skilled intertemporal utility for
entrants in unemployment, exp[rVU,l] (in certainty equivalent; euros/month). Note that the impact on
the low-skilled (salaried) employment-active population ratio, el, is the same as in Table 3. Information
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Figure 2: Simulated eﬀects of the entry rate into programmes that enhance matching eﬀec-
tiveness, γl. Legend: Scale on the horizontal axis : 100∗γl; Indicators: Low-skilled tightness
θl, vacancy rate vl, net wage rate wl (euros/month), search eﬀort levels s·,l, diﬀerence in hir-
ing rates (cT,lsT,l − clsU,l)α(θl), unemployment rate ul + xl + tl, salaried employment-active
population ratio el, participation rate pl, intertemporal utility levels exp[rV·,l] (in certainty
equivalent; euros/month); utilitarian criterion within the active population.
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